1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

744

By September 1952, authorities in Kwangtung Province reported that the movement was carried into its second phase of "consolidation and regularization." A cleaning system was set up and the inhabitants were organized. Each street designated at least one day a month as "People's Health Day."[19]

At the First Session of the First National People's Congress, Li Teh-ch'üan, Minister of Health, strongly urged the continuation of the Patriotic Health Drive as one of the chief tasks for the Communist national health program. She proposed to make it an annual drive, because it seemed the most effective way to prevent disease and improve the health of the people.[20]

VI. FLOOD IN CENTRAL CHINA

744
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The year 1954 brought extraordinary flood conditions to the China Mainland. (See chapter on Public Welfare.) The areas most severely stricken were the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi in the Central-South Region, which provided another test case for the integration of public health work with a mass movement. Health and sanitation workers were not only needed to administer to the victims of the flood, but, even more importantly, to care for the huge labor forces fighting the flood. A health center for flood prevention was formed in Hupeh Province, under the Wuhan municipal government. Four teams were sent to

19. Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], March 19, 1953, p. 3.

20. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 922, Nov. 5, 1954, pp. 42-43.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

exercise control over food and drinking water, to supervise the preparation of food for flood workers, and to improve the environmental hygiene for both the flood workers and victims. A special epidemic prevention corps of 170 went among the laborers, working on the dikes to disseminate health propaganda and to distribute disinfecting equipment. The Communist report also mentioned that doctors with native medical training and clerks in herb shops were mobilized to assist.[21]

744
731

One report from the Mainland, indicating the seriousness of the flood, revealed that as late as March 1955 a group of medical workers was dispatched to the flooded areas in Hupeh by the Ministry of Health in Peking. This group consisted of 48 doctors, 48 nurses, and 41 pharmacists from the distant province of Heilungkiang (Amur Province) in Manchuria; they were divided into two main teams and six small teams.[22]

In Hunan and Kiangsi provinces, similar drives and similar accomplishments were reported. Some 2,000 medical workers of both Chinese and Western medical training were mobilized to work in the flooded areas in the vicinity of Tung-t'ing Lake in Hunan Province.[23] In Kiangsi, a total of 1,245 medical

21. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, Sept. 10, 1954, p. 3.
22. Ibid., March 20, 1955, p. 2.
23. Ibid., Oct. 22, 1954, p. 2.

workers were organized into 114 mobile teams; 22 per cent were doctors with Chinese medical training. Some 270,000 people received treatment, according to the same report, and 79 per cent of these treatments were administered without charge.[24] However, no attempt has been made to show what groups constituted the 21 per cent who had to pay for medical treatment during the disaster.

VII. CONCLUSION

In Central-South China, infanticide still exists in certain areas. It is a serious matter and helps to suggest the complexity of the social problems and the uneven progress achieved in the different regions and communities in Communist China. In four counties of southeastern Kwangtung Province, 1,882 cases of infanticide were reported in 1950-51.[25] According to the record of two orphanages in Chanchiang (Kwangchowan), 14,193 female foundlings were taken in during the period 1935-1951.[26] The Communists blamed the situation on existing social patterns of inequality between the sexes, superstition, the decadent feudal system, and "feudalistic ideas" on marriage.

Although schistosoma japonicum is most serious in East China, the Central-South Region is also effected by this peculiar disease, particularly in the area along the Yangtze River in Hupeh Province. The Communists have attempted to fight schistosomiasis, but a cure has not yet been found.

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24. Ibid.
25. Yangtze Daily, Aug. 6, 1952, p. 3.
26. South China Daily, Aug. 28, 1952, p. 3.

I:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Despite the great contribution to Chinese welfare resulting from the efforts of peaceful projects of this sort, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was suspended when the Chinese Communists became the victors on the Mainland of China, although such efforts, had they continued, might well have been perverted and subverted by the Communists. 746

II. CALAMITIES SINCE 1949

Since the establishment of the Communist regime in China, many natural disasters have occurred. Droughts, floods, locust invasions, frost, windstorms, and hail-storms have caused famines which began in the rural districts and spread throughout the nation. An anti-Communist source has given the following estimate of the number of people adversely affected since 1949 by national calamities, climaxed by the great flood of 1954. 731

1949	60,000,000
1950	38,000,000
1951	28,000,000
1952	33,000,000
1953	47,000,000
1954	180,000,000

No region has escaped entirely from these disasters. If there are differences between them, it is only a matter of degree.

As if these natural calamities were not disastrous enough, the people on the China Mainland suffered further abuse from man-made adversities,

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

such as the Land Reform Movement, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the war in Korea, and the government's "planned purchase" of agricultural products. The number of people who have been affected by the Communist quest for power is estimated to have been about 90,000,000 during the first four years of the Communist regime.[5]

Throughout the Central-South Region in the past five years, natural calamities have been extensive. One estimate reveals that in 1952 alone the number of people stricken by the spring and summer famines in the six provinces of the Central-South Region were as follows:[6]

Hupeh	6,300,000
Hunan	4,000,000
Kwangtung	8,000,000
Kwangsi	2,250,000
Kiangsi	3,000,000
Honan	9,000,000

Later in the same year, the six provinces again suffered from floods and insects. In 1954, the Mainland of China was once more subjected to floods, which even the Communists themselves

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5. Kung-fei Ti Chiu-chi Kung-tso [Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists] , 6th Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1955, pp. 5-6. It should be noted that source references originating in Taipei are almost invariably sponsored by the Chinese Nationalist Party. As well as being anti-Communist in intent, they may sometimes serve as a media for pro-Nationalist propaganda.

6. P'ien-ti Tsai-huang Ai Ta-lu [Widespread Calamities on the Continent] , Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee of Kuomintang , 1952, pp. 26-27.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

termed "without parallel in history."[7] The most devastated area was in the middle of the Yangtze River Valley, particularly Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi.

The Land Reform Movement in Central-South China was begun in 1950 and all but completed in 1952. In 1953 a re-investigation was ordered. As a result, 23,000 more landowners were purged. Of this number, about 5,000 were put to death, and the remaining 18,000 either went to jail or to "Reform-through-labor" camps. A large number of landowners were victims of land reform in the Central-South during 1950-53.[8]

III. COMMUNIST RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

After the Hwai River flood of 1949, the Central Relief Committee was formed (February 1950) under the Government Administration Council as a temporary but integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, similar committees were set up in the provinces and municipalities. Their existence, on the whole, has been in name only, according to an anti-Communist report, and it is

7. Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 962, Jan. 6, 1955, pp. 18-20.

8. Ch'ih K'ung-pu-hsia Ti Hu-pei [Hupeh Under Red Terror], 6th Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1954, pp. 16-20.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

for new work in the period 1950-52, some 21 training centers were established and 6,196 young people were trained, although only 3,634 of this number found employment. In the three-year period, 21,149 persons obtained work through government recommendation, and of this number 80 per cent were put to work in textile factories.[26]

On the problem of labor and employment, the chief of the Bureau of Labor of Kwangtung Province reported in September 1952 that in two years' time 53,724 persons, including unemployed intellectuals and returned overseas Chinese, were benefited by relief measures and by government assistance in obtaining work. It was claimed that the provincial government spent JMP$2,760,000,000 (about US$123,633) for relief and distributed over 4,000,000 pounds of grain. At the time of the report, the Kwangtung provincial government hoped to solve the problem of unemployment in forty-seven urban areas (with a population of over 10,000,000) by advising the jobless to seek work in the rural districts.[27]

In 1954, the China Mainland was stricken by flood.[28] The areas most affected were the northern provinces of the Central-South Region, Hupeh Hunan, and Kiangsi, along the Yangtze River and around Lake Tungting. In Wuhan alone, 1'00,000 people were mobilized to fight the flood.[29] From July 8 to September 24, 1954, it was said, 1,616

26. Ibid.

27. Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], Canton, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 3.

28. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 1.

29. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, July 19, 1954.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

731 •

students of Wuhan University worked to win "victory from the flood."[30] The same report listed the work of these students accomplished; they dug 9,352 carloads and 100 boatloads of dirt, removed 151,838 "shoulder poles" of dirt, loaded and unloaded 5,437 carloads and 491 boatloads of dirt, and transported 2,009 carloads of dirt and 730 carloads of rocks. "Triumph over the flood" was achieved by human efforts. In fighting the flood of 1954, [31] 12,000,000 refugees were used as common laborers.

An editorial in the People's Daily on December 19, 1954 not only summed up the flood and relief situation, but also made certain criticisms. In some famine-stricken areas in Hupeh, sufficient attention was not paid to the organization of production to combat the famine. Some cadres did not have a clear idea of state relief and loans, and in these areas they grew slack or even gave up leadership. In the co-operation necessary among those engaged in fighting the flood and in flood prevention, some groups failed to respond with "full understanding and whole-hearted support."[32]

V. CHILD WELFARE

527
858

Following the international practice of dedicating one day in the year to children, April 4 was promulgated as China's Children's Day by the Nationalist Government in 1931. But the Chinese Communist

30. Ibid., Oct. 20, 1954, p. 2.

31. Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, p. 10.

32. People's Daily, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 1.

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 (Central) S-8 China AF14

653
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

[facing p. 642 (6)]

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

estimated 15,000 tons; in 1952, the output was again increased to over 30,000 tons. The Central-South China Region is also the main source of fresh-water fry for the entire country. In 1953 alone, the production of pond-bred fish amounted to 112,500 tons, which was about 67 per cent of the pre-war peak year's production of 150,000 tons.[29] During the first half of 1954, about 25,000 tons of fish were caught by deep-sea fishermen, an increase of 30 per cent over the catch of 1953. All of the figures quoted above are derived from Communist sources, and their accuracy may be subject to question. They should be considered with due caution.

VII. WATER CONSERVATION AND FLOOD CONTROL

A. The Nature of Floods

For centuries the Chinese people have waged a stubborn struggle against the floods of their many rivers. Among them, the Yangtze, Yellow, and Huai rivers, which all run through the Central-South Region, are notorious for floods. Generally -- in spring and summer each year -- warm, moist monsoons blowing inland from the sea are met and held over Central China in the region of the Yangtze

29. Ibid.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Valley by dry air currents from the cold northern continental area, resulting in steady seasonal rains, usually in June and July, and, creating a threat of flood on the Yangtze.

The unrestricted felling of timber in the past centuries has led to the complete destruction of forests along the banks of the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River, causing rapid erosion of the loose soil. The silt is carried in huge amounts by rain-swollen streams into the great river, and over many centuries has silted up the channel in the slow-flowing lower reaches on the plain. A great system of dikes has been built along the banks of the river to prevent it from flooding. Today in some places the river actually flows above the level of the nearby plains. The river, however, has frequently breached its dikes and, flowing over the land, cut a new course to the sea. Because of these terrible floods the Yellow River has been given the name of "China's Sorrow." In the four thousand years of its recorded history, the Yellow River has breached its dikes over sixteen-hundred times and changed its main course seven times. Following the repeated flooding of the silt-laden Yellow River into the Hwai River, the latter river too, has been silted up.

Since the fourteenth century the Huai has had an average of seventy major and minor floods every hundred years.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

B. The Flood of 1954

731 •

In 1954, flood plagued the Yangtze and the Hwai River basins. As a result of breaches of dikes, inadequate drainage, and failure of some hydraulic structures, 160.5 million shih-mou (26.8 million acres)[30] of farm land, mostly within the Central-South Region, were inundated. The number of people directly affected by the flood is estimated at 50 million, and 10 million refugees from Hupeh, Hunan, and Honan provinces required resettlement in nearby areas. The major portionof the area flooded during July and August 1954 was under early rice to be harvested between August and September, or late rice to be harvested in early November. The loss of food-grains was serious. Up to the latter part of September 1954, over half of the flooded farm land was still under water.

The tremendous damage done by this flood may be attributed partly to the magnitude of the flood itself and partly to inadequate preventive measures for flood control. The Communist Premier, Chou En-Lai, in his report to the First Session of the National People's Congress in September 1954, stated: "The flood of this year [1954] has revealed many errors in the past with respect to water-

30. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19, May 12, 1955, p. 601.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

conservation activities; for example, the standards adopted for the design of flood control were generally too low, and many individual structures were not constructed to ensure sufficient safety."

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C. Water-Conservation Projects in Central-South China

During the five years of Communist rule, a number of large-scale water conservation works have been built. During the past five-year period, incomplete data showed that some 102,300 million cubic feet of earthworks were completed. According to the Communists, with this amount of earth a wall three feet high and three feet wide, could be built to run 73 times around the equator.[31] Over 670 million cubic feet of stone and more than 27 million cubic feet of cement were used.

Among the most important water conservation projects in Central-South China, those on the Huai River and the Chingchiang tributaries of the Yangtze are significant. Along the Huai River, up to June 1955, work on the harnessing project was progressing at great speed, mostly by "forced labor." Its principal reservoirs are described below.[32]

31. People's China, Jan. 16, 1955, p. 12.
32. People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 519-20; Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, Jan. 19, 1955.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

731

1. Nan-Wan Reservoir, in Honan Province, now partially complete, will irrigate about 440,000 shih-mou (73,333 acres) of land and will have a maximum generating power of 2,500 k.w. Its capacity is 805,000 million cubic feet.

2. Pai-sha Reservoir, in Honan Province, was completed in 1954. It can irrigate 400,000 shih-mou (66,667 acres) of land and has a maximum capacity of 247,000 million cubic feet.

3. Po-shan Reservoir, in Honan Province, was completed in 1954. It can irrigate 400,000 shih-mou (66,667 acres) of land and has a maximum generating power of 4,000 k.w. Its capactiy is 284,000 cubic feet.

4. Pan-ch'iao Reservoir, in Honan Province, was completed in 1954. It can irrigate about 150,000 shih-mou (25,000 acres) of land and has a capacity of 200,000 million cubic feet.

5. Shih-man-t'an Reservoir, in Honan Province, when completed will irrigate 90,000 shih-mou of land and will have a capacity of 50,000 million cubic feet.

The Chingkiang Flood Diversion Works covers an area of over 347 miles and has a capacity of 194,223 million cubic feet.[33]

33. People's China, Jan. 16, 1955, pp. 11-12.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

731

The entire project, according to the Communists' estimate, will require about twenty years to complete. By April 25, 1954, only the second stage of construction work had been finished. According to reports from Communist China, on August 7, 1954, when the river reached the mark of 182 feet, 10.07 inches at Ichang, just below the Yangtze Gorges, it was calculated that the flood crest would cover the top of the crucial Chingkiang Dike on the middle reaches. Orders were given to open the Chingkiang Flood-Diversion Basin, and the river, although far surpassing its highest record at Shashih, was safely contained by the dike. It was this part of the construction work that saved Wuhan from flood[34] in 1954. As of May 1955, dike repair work in the Tungting Lake area had been completed, and the capacity of this lake was enlarged by 6,200 million cubic meters. At the same time, the dikes around the Ching-chiang Water-Detention Basin have been raised from one to three meters.

So far, no major engineering projects have been started on the Yellow River, and only minor work on dike-strengthening has been done from time to time. A new and comprehensive plan, "The Fundamental Water

34. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19, May 12, 1955, p. 606.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Conservation Plan of the Yellow River," was drafted and presented to the Second Session of the National People's Congress by Teng Tzu-hui, Vice-premier of the People's Republic of China, on July 18, 1955.[35] The most important work of the plan within the Central-South Region is the construction of the giant San-men-hsia [Gorge of the Three Gates] Reservoir in Shan-hsien, Honan Province, a project which includes water detention, irrigation, and power. The construction of this reservoir, according to the plan, will begin in 1957 and be completed in 1964. A Communist source reported that the total area of the reservoir will exceed 2,350 kilometers, and thus will be larger than T'ai Lake.

Beside the above-mentioned projects, local governments have constructed many small irrigation works with the help of the peasants. They followed the traditional pattern, "small in scale but large in number," and included ponds, ditches, and wells. All these measures can help, directly or indirectly, the improvement of agricultural production.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The fundamental defects of agricultural

35. China Daily News, New York, July 29, 1955.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

697

youths scattered throughout the Central-South provinces. Workers in these institutions are more or less restricted to their place of detention. There is no official account of the location and number of prisons. However, according to 1948 statistics, there were 556 prisons and detention houses in the Central-South provinces.[6] Since the 1954 regulations governing forced labor provide for the establishment of detention houses at the hsien level, it may be assumed that there are a minimum of 664 prisons and detention houses in the 618 hsien and 46 municipalities of the area. The actual number is likely to be appreciably larger. On the other hand, units of "reform-through-labor" corps are highly mobile. Subject to the overall control of the national Ministry of Public Security and its agencies, they may be transferred to places where cheap mass labor may be used, and are often found on important construction sites within the Central-South. Some of the activities in which forced labor has been engaged will be briefly described in the following sections.

II. THE CHING-CHIANG PROJECT (HUPEH AND HUNAN)

466
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653

The section of the Yangtze between Chih-chiang in Hupeh and Ch'eng-ling'chi in Hunan, also known as the Ching-chiang, is the site of a major water-

6. Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, p. 392.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

466
731
653

conservation project in Central-South China in which mass labor has been employed. A 133-kilometer (about 83 miles) dyke had been built under the Nationalists, which served to protect some seven million mou (about 1.05 million acres) of farm land, with a population of three million, against the annual flood in August-September. Known as the "life line" of the people, the dyke had fallen into disrepair. Accordingly, strengthening of the original dyke became the first part of the Ching-chiang project under the Communists. The second part of the project consisted of the construction of a large flood-water reservoir (projected capacity, 5.5 billion cubic meters or about 194 billion cubic feet) east of the Hu-tu River and west of the Ching-chiang.[7]

The directive to proceed with the harnessing of the Ching-chiang was issued by the Central-South Military and Political Committee on March 15, 1952. At the same time, it was announced that "voluntary" labor, meaning "unpaid" labor as a rule, would be recruited as was the case in the Hwai River project.[8] In addition, flood victims and refugees, as well as the army, were called upon to take part. The army was assigned to dredge the Huang-t'ien (Yellow Sky) Lake, one of the most difficult parts of the project. The

7. Ch'ih-se K'ung-pu-hsia Ti Hu-pei [Hupeh Under the Red Terror], Taipei, Chung-yang wei-yuan-hui ti-liu-tsu, October, 1954, p. 22.

8. Hwai River Project is discussed in the East China Region study.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

466
731
653

entire labor force was organized in the fashion of an army, directed by General Headquarters and Command posts which were in turn supervised by a Flood Control Committee.

Working conditions at the Ching-chiang project may be glimpsed from Communist press reports extolling the project workers' achievements. One such passage reads: "Right after lunch, the fighters went back to work. When their primitive tools broke down, they just jumped into the bone-chilling water and dug out the sticky mud with their bare hands. On the eleventh day (from the beginning of the project), they worked past midnight, but returned to work the following day in spite of their exhaustion."[9] Another report states: "When the tempo of work was stepped up, the workers had only one meal a day, and they worked day and night for seven consecutive days...On one occasion, workers on the Hu-tu River did not have enough time to place wooden blocks on the river bed, and one whole company jumped into the river to block the sliding of the mud."[10] "Some of the fighters formed three-man teams. One person would lie down on the mud serving as a dredge, the other two would pile mud on him and in this way drag the mud out of the river bed. Besides the man's two twinkling eyes, there was no other sign of human life."[11]

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9. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao, March 16, 1952.
10. Ibid., March 26, 1952.
11. Ibid., June 21, 1952.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Work on the Ching-chiang project commenced on April 5, 1952, and the first part of the plan was completed on June 20 of the same year. The volume of earth excavation totaled 23.1 million cubic meters,[12] approximately equivalent to over 20 million man-days, taking into account the almost complete absence of construction machinery. However, since further construction and annual maintenance and repair in view of the recurrent floods have had to be carried out, the continued employment of mass labor on the same general construction site may be expected.

III. LABOR CONTINGENTS IN HIGHWAY AND RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION (KWANGTUNG AND KWANGSI)

In the building of railways and highways both civilian labor and inactive troops are also used. According to a central government directive of March 31, 1951, civilians may be conscripted to work on highways at the rate of ten man-days a year. They have to supply their own tools and food and are given no monetary remuneration.[13] Only two railways have been built in the Central-South provinces since 1950, one from Lai-pin to Mu-nan-kuan (formerly Chen-nan-kuan) in Kwangsi, the other from Li-t'ang in Kwangsi to Chan-chiang (Kuang-chou-wan) in Kwangtung. Although highway construction has been concentrated in Northwest and Southwest China, some lines have also been built with mass labor in the Central-South, including the lines from Mei-hsien

12. Ronald Hsia, The Role of Labor-Intensive Investment Projects in China's Capital Formation, Cambridge, Mass., Center for Internat'l Studies, M.I.T., summer, 1954, p. 90.

13. [See following page.]